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INTRODUCTION 
When Britain
1 first considered the case for joining what was then know as the EEC, 
environmental considerations were at best secondary to what were widely perceived to be 
more pressing national interests, such as trade, agriculture and the sovereignty of 
parliament.  When the decision to join was finally taken in 1972, there was still a 
widespread view in Britain, that - to paraphrase the title of this book – as a full member 
state, British environmental policy would thereafter formally be ‘in Europe’, but 
European environmental policy would not conceivably ever be ‘in Britain’.  Or, to put it 
slightly differently, membership would offer Britain an opportunity to share its long 
experience of dealing with environmental problems with other member states, but British 
policy would not - and for many dominant actors including the national environment 
ministry, should not - be systematically Europeanized by Europe. In adopting a top-down 
approach for understanding the impact of EU membership on British politics, Bache and 
Jordan (forthcoming) define Europeanisation as ‘the reorientation or reshaping of aspects 
of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices and 
preferences of European level actors, as advanced through EU initiatives and decisions’. 
This definition provides the starting point for this discussion. 
 
Why was this?  First, even by the late 1960s, environmental policy constituted an extremely 
minor aspect of EU affairs; EU environmental policy was not formally initiated until 1972 
and did not really start in earnest until the early 1980s.  There was, therefore, very little EU 
                                                 
1 As this paper is mostly concerned with events in England, and, to lesser extent, Scotland and Wales, I 
use the term ‘Britain’ rather than United Kingdom.  
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environmental policy on the statute books in 1972 that could conceivably Europeanize 
Britain or indeed any other member state.  Environmental issues did not, for instance warrant 
a single mention in the Government White Paper on EEC membership, published in July 
1971. 
 
Second, there was a very widely shared view that British policy was inherently better than 
the policies of continental states or anything that the EEC might conceivably produce.  Aside 
from a very small number of radical environmentalists, “the issue [of membership] was seen 
essentially to do with joining a trading bloc” (Lowe and Ward, 1998, 11).  By the early 
1970s, Britain had amassed plenty of experience about how to achieve its ‘non’ domestic 
environmental concerns (e.g. the survival of endangered species such as tigers and elephants, 
as well as migrating birds) (ibid., 9) by working through international bodies such as the UN.  
Therefore, most British environmentalists assumed that if EEC membership had any 
environmental implications (the widespread view was that on balance it would not), the 
dominant flow of influence would run the other way i.e. from Britain to the other member 
states. 
 
However, these initial expectations of very minimal Europeanization proved to be 
spectacularly wide of the mark.  Thirty years after Britain formally joined the EU, almost all 
national environmental policy is made by, or in close association with, EU environmental 
policy.  Furthermore, the EU is now regarded as the dominant source of environmental policy 
initiatives and the most significant ‘external’ force on British environmental policy, which  
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far outweighs even the combined influence of the UN and the OECD.  British environmental 
groups and British businesses have altered the locus of their lobbying activities accordingly. 
 
This  attempts to do four main things: identify the traditional features of national policy prior 
to the EU’s involvement; describe the main phases of British-EU relations (i.e. the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s); pinpoint the main changes in domestic thinking and practice which can be 
causally related to the EU’s involvement; consider what the story of Europeanization in this 
particular sector reveals about the common themes raised by Bache and Jordan (forthcoming) 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured around these four main questions.  Thus, Section 
Two describes what British environmental policy looked like prior to the EU’s involvement.  
This provides a simple analytical baseline upon which subsequent changes are mapped.  As 
this book is primarily concerned about the Europeanization of national policy and politics, 
the baseline used differentiates between the content, structures and style of national policy.  
These three features are presented as being analytically distinct, but in practice, they are often 
subtly interrelated.  Following Hall (1993), the content of national policy is divided into three 
different sub-aspects or ‘levels’.  The first comprises the overall goals that guide policy. 
These goals operate within a policy paradigm or a ‘framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain 
them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (ibid.: 279).  
The second covers the instruments or techniques by which these policy goals are attained, 
e.g. direct regulation, fiscal instruments, or voluntary agreements.  Finally, the third level  
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measures the calibration of these policy instruments, e.g. the level of an emission standard or 
tax, etc.  
 
National structures meanwhile, range from formal bureaucratic organizations with staff, 
budgets and buildings, through to more informal phenomena such as codes, conventions and 
other socialized ways of looking at the world (Peters 1999: 28, 146).  This paper seeks to 
cover both aspects i.e. the basic building blocks of the state (i.e. the ‘machinery’ of 
government: departments, agencies, formal relations between national and sub-national 
layers of government, etc.), through to the norms and rules (both formal and informal) that 
govern the operation of its constituent parts.  Finally, the section on the style of national 
policy draws upon what Richardson originally described as society's “standard operating 
procedures for making and implementing policies” (Richardson et al. 1982: 2).  By that, he 
meant: (1) the dominant approach to problem solving, ranging from anticipatory/active to 
reactive, and (2) the government's relationship to other actors, characterized by their 
inclination either to reach consensus with organized groups or to impose decisions. 
 
Having constructed this baseline, Section Three then briefly describes the historical evolution 
of national and EU policy.  Then, Section Four identifies how the EU has affected the 
content, structure and style of national policy.  Finally, Section Five investigates what the 
events in the environmental sector reveal about Britain’s role in Europe and Europe’s 
growing involvement in British affairs. 
 
THE TRADITIONAL FEATURES OF NATIONAL POLICY  
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The dominant style of national policy 
Voluntarism, discretion and practicability are the words that are commonly used to described 
British environmental policy prior to the EU’s involvement (Weale, 1997).  Weale et al. 
(2000, 180-181) believe the national policy style embodied a strong commitment to co-
operation, administrative discretion and technical specialization.  Thus, as new problems 
emerged and became important, new laws were enacted and new agencies put in place to 
administer them.  As it was sold to foreigners by British politicians (Waldegrave, 1985), “the 
British approach” was predominantly reactive rather than anticipatory, tactical rather than 
strategic, pragmatic rather than ambitious, and case-by-case rather than uniform.  In practice, 
it amounted to a ‘trial and error’ search for the most cost effective (i.e. to business) solutions 
to policy problems. 
 
It is fair to say that it was not just born of the need for political expediency.  Influential and 
independent policy elites genuinely believed that ‘muddling through’ problems was 
inherently superior to strategic, long term planning, which they viewed as being far too 
abstract and too rigid (Ashby and Anderson, 1981).  This attitude of mind sprang from the 
British legal system (which relies heavily on common law with its constant interplay between 
precedent and interpretation), its informal and constantly evolving constitution, and the 
widespread desire to optimise pollution rather than minimise waste emissions regardless of 
their environmental impact (see below). 
 
Pragmatic opportunism has traditionally gone hand in hand with a particular style of 
operating, which has been described as informal, reactive, gradualist and accommodative.  In  
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operational terms, the regulation of environmentally damaging activities proceeded on the 
basis of courteous negotiation between polluters and regulators operating in exclusive policy 
communities of experts (what Weale et al. 2000: 181 term ‘club government’). 
 
 
 
The main structures of national policy 
At the dawn of modern environmental policy in 1970, Britain had some of the oldest and 
most innovative policy structures in the world.  In 1863, the UK created the first industrial 
permitting agency in the world, known as the Alkali Inspectorate (which has since been 
merged into the national Environment Agency – see below).  In 1970, it also created the 
Department of the Environment), which at the time, was the very first environmental 
ministry in the world  
 
Although these structures of government have changed since 1970, their guiding philosophy 
has remained largely unchanged.  This philosophy holds that central government should only 
ever set the broad legislative or policy framework, leaving the detailed aspects of policy fine-
tuning and implementation either to specialist agencies such as the Alkali Inspectorate (see 
above) or to local bureaucrats working in local or regional government.  Compare this with 
the EU, in which the EU institutions develop highly specific policy proposals, which are they 
passed down to the national level to be implemented.  Unlike MEPs, British MPs played very 
little part in determining the detailed content of environmental protection policies; although  
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they passed the necessary framework legislation, the task of implementing was devolved to 
more specialist agencies operating well away from the public gaze. 
 
Finally, the legal structures of environmental policy (i.e. a mixture of statute and common 
law; no environmental court or tribunals, or a constitutional commitment to environmental 
protection) are consistent with Britain’s common law traditions, its unwritten constitution 
and consensual policy style (very few legal disputes ever reached court). 
The content of national policy 
It is actually quite difficult to identify an overall philosophy or paradigm of British policy 
other than that pollution should be optimised by limiting its effects in the environment rather 
than reduced at source (Weale et al. 2000: 177; Jordan, 2002).  One influential assessment of 
British practice (Lowe and Flynn, 1989) concluded that British policy was in fact little more 
than a pragmatic “accretion of common law, statutes, agencies, procedures and policies”.  
Traditionally, the underlying principle of policy has been that standards should be 
‘reasonably practicable’ i.e. tailored to reflect local conditions and circumstances, the 
economic costs of abatement and the current state of technical knowledge (Jordan, 1998: 
180-1).  This approach was assumed to be more effective and more economically efficient 
than forcing all polluters to attain the same (i.e. harmonised) statutory standards.  This 
pragmatic, case-by-case approach (see above) was staunchly defended by different parts of 
the scientific and political establishment in Britain (Ashby and Anderson, 1981; Waldegrave, 
1985). 
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Britain was reluctant to set long term policy goals, especially whose achievement could not 
be guaranteed.  The preference instead was for targets to be negotiated incrementally 
between industry and technical agencies.  The ‘technology forcing’ element of German 
policy has never really taken root in Britain.  Where long term goals were set, they tended to 
be associated with distinct geographical areas (i.e. they were EQOs or EQSs), as opposed to 
the emission limits favoured by continental European states. 
 
In terms of the policy instruments used, regulation was generally preferred to taxes, subsidies 
and the kind of sectoral covenants that began to appear in The Netherlands, France and 
Germany in the 1970s.  Crucially, British regulatory instruments were somewhat different to 
those used in continental European states and the EU.  Whereas the latter preferred fixed 
legislative standards and deadlines to ensure comparability of effort and simplify the process 
of monitoring and enforcement, Britain usually opted for unwritten agreements with 
polluters, general legal guidelines and standards, and flexible implementation systems, which 
could be tailored to suit political and financial exigencies (see above). 
 
Summary 
These three aspects fitted closely together.  Thus the allocation of task between the main 
structures reflected the dominant style and the ‘contextual’ paradigm of British policy (see 
below), the finer details of which could not possibly have been worked out by civil servants 
working at desks in London or Cardiff.  Close, secretive collaborative relationship provided 
an effective means of making the subtle trade offs required to optimize pollution.  As a rule,  
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regulators working in specialised agencies preferred not to set standards which could not be 
complied with. 
 
There are several other features of national environmental policy and politics prior to 1973 
that stand out.  First, the British tended to view ‘environmental policy’ in slightly narrower 
terms than other industrialized northern European states.  British policy prior to the EU’s 
involvement was thus narrower than the norm, insofar as it focused on a small sub-set of 
environmental concerns i.e. those that were predominantly human health related or were 
associated with governing a relatively crowded island state sharing no land borders with 
others states (e.g. heritage and landscape protection, land use planning and nature 
conservation). 
 
Second, British elites were extremely ‘proud’ of these arrangements (Hajer, 1995).  Some 
used the supposed superiority of British protection systems to argue against any EU 
involvement in environmental standard setting.  In the late 1970s, the DoE (1978) claimed 
that it was already “at a comparatively advanced stage of development and adoption of 
environmental protection policies,” the implication being that the Commission’s help was not 
required.  This organizational assumption was shared by many influential members of the 
political establishment, who genuinely believed that national policy had achieved “a superior 
level of fitness, through 160 years of our own history” (Ashby and Anderson 1981: 513).  
Before the main aims of EU environmental policy had even been agreed by the European 
Council, the DoE informed the European Commission that it should not invest too much time 
in designing common policies, because Britain was “well placed to cope with its own  
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environmental problems” (in Evans, 1983, 43).  And in a very early foreshadowing of the 
contemporary debate about subsidiarity, it warned the Commission to “concentrate on issues 
that are truly European in scope” (ibid., 45) (i.e. meaning those with an obvious trade 
dimension). 
 
Finally, almost from the outset, there was an obvious misfit between what many continental 
European states regarded as being the most immediate priorities (i.e. the pollution of shared 
water courses such as estuaries and rivers) and Britain’s twin specialisms: international 
environmental diplomacy (i.e. through the organs of the UN); and remedying what were 
essentially ‘domestic’ issues such as nature conservation, land use planning and local air 
pollution.  Crucially, while the former required detailed and intensive intra-EU collaboration, 
the latter could (and, Britain believed, should) be pursued through international or local 
means.  In a sense, then, Britain and the rest of the EU were set firmly on the path to conflict. 
 
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF BRITISH POLICY: A SHORT HISTORY 
The 1970s: small beginnings 
Conflict did indeed very quickly surface when the Commission issued specific regulatory 
proposals.  A proposal issued in 1974 to reduce the emission of dangerous substances to 
water triggered a very deep conflict.  A Directive (which contained extensive exemptions for 
Britain), was only agreed in 1976 after much wrangling.  This episode soured British-EU 
environmental relations for years to come.  Part of the problem was that the British did very 
little to upload its policies to EU, therefore the Commission tended to base its thinking on 
other countries’ priorities (Jordan, 2002: 31-2).  There were, of course, areas where the DoE  
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successfully took the initiative in Europe - or at least supported European solutions (e.g. the 
Birds Directive, the 1981 Regulation on whales and the 1975 Directive on waste) but they 
were far “fewer than might have been expected of a country with such a well established 
environmental policy” (Haigh, 1984: 302).  Instead, Britain tried to steer EU environmental 
policy from the margins by blocking policies that misfitted with its settled domestic 
traditions.  Extensive state ownership and/or sponsorship of key polluting industries such as 
water, energy and farming, provided Whitehall with many strong, short-term economic 
reasons to resist the environmental investments demanded by more ambitious states such as 
Germany and the Netherlands.  When EU policies were adopted, the DoE tried to mask their 
impact by relying upon administrative implementation mechanisms such as circulars rather 
than primary or secondary legislation. 
 
The creeping Europeanization of national policy did not, however, trigger much societal 
debate.  The only group which seemed at all aware of what was happening were law lords.  
Very early on, the House of Lords select committee on the European communities issued a 
detailed report that sought to the EEC’s growing competence in areas (such as the 
environment) that did not sit with its formal remit.  Their Lordships believed that “the… 
transfer of sovereignty should be defined and the Community should keep within its powers”, 
because it “causes an irreversible removal of legislative power from [Britain]” (HOLSCEC, 
1978, 16, 17).  Interestingly, not one witness - not even the DoE – could say precisely how 
much legislation had been adopted thus far, or assess what its impact had been. 
 
The 1980s: growing conflicts  
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During the mid to late 1980s, EU environmental policy entered a new and much more 
energetic phase.  The DoE’s failure to upload British policy ideas to the EU combined with 
the national environmental movement’s increasingly strident demands for the existing rules 
to be implemented soon combined to generate a series of sizeable policy misfits.  During this 
period, the DoE tried to limit Europeanization by employing its veto in the Environment 
Council, typified by the five-year battle against the EIA Directive even though it merely 
formalised existing practice.  It also made every effort to neuter legislation that was passed, 
typified by the identification of just 27 bathing beaches under the Bathing Water Directive, 
or the highly selective implementation of the 1980 Drinking Water Directive.  To make 
matters worse, the Commission began to oppose Britain’s attempts to close misfits by 
initiating infringement proceedings.  These culminated in judgments by the ECJ, which 
significantly sharpened the legal force of EU Directives. 
 
By the mid-1980s, Britain was markedly out of step with the rest of Europe, weighed down 
by a very poor environmental reputation, and in dispute with many important domestic 
environmental actors such as the HOLSCEC, the RCEP and even traditionally ‘insider’ 
pressure groups such as the RSPB.  Neutering Europeanization by attempting to block and/or 
subvert key directives not only conspicuously failed to close the misfit, but also lumbered 
Britain with a reputation for being ‘the Dirty Man of Europe.’  Gradually, Britain began to 
experience more and more of the political crises that plague those states that persistently 
download policy from the EU.  In Britain’s case, the crises arose when EU polices escaped 
from the narrow confines of the ‘environmental’ parts of the DoE and began to intrude into  
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much more politically important areas of its core business, principally water and later energy 
privatisation (Jordan and Greenaway, 1998). 
 
When the domestic green party achieved an unprecedented 15% share of the national vote in 
the 1989 European Parliamentary elections, the then Conservative government tried to 
present a much greener face to the domestic electorate and the rest of the EU.  With the 
Prime Minister’s backing, the DoE won a number of important inter-departmental battles 
against other departments on issues such as acid rain (1986), North Sea pollution (1987) and 
ozone depletion (1987), that helped to realign Britain with other northern industrialised 
European member states. 
The 1990s: from policy taking to policy shaping 
By the early 1990s, the Europeanization of national policy had progressed so far and the 
political conflicts it had generated had become so distracting, that continuing to ‘take’ policy 
from Brussels in the hope that it could be blocked either in the Environment Council or 
watered down at the implementation stage was effectively no longer a viable political 
strategy.  With the added push of greater majority voting in the Council, Britain had no other 
choice but to become more communautaire.  Starting in the late 1980s, Britain embarked on 
a comprehensive strategy to shape the EU by uploading more policy ideas to the EU, such as 
those concerning integrated pollution control, EMAS and environmental policy integration.   
 
Today, Britain is to be found exporting domestic environmental ideas to Brussels with a 
passion unimaginable even fifteen years ago.  Britain is no longer perceived as the Dirty Man 
of Europe (there are other candidates for this role); on the contrary, in some areas (e.g.  
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climate change) it regarded as an environmental lead state in Europe, although by no means 
in all (e.g. waste management, recycling, renewable energy generation and GMOs).  This 
strategy of proactive shaping has been so successful that well known lead states such as 
Germany are now to be heard complaining that recent EU policies have a “distinctly British 
flavour” (Wurzel, 1999: 128). 
 
HOW MUCH EUROPEANIZATION HAS OCCURRED? 
The style of British policy  
The style of British environmental policy in Britain 
There are two aspects to policy style: the style of British policy in Britain, and the style of the 
British in the EU.  The style in which contemporary British environmental policy is 
enunciated and implemented is undeniably very different to that described above i.e. 
consensual and reactive (Jordan and Richardson 1982: 81; Richardson and Watts 1985).  We 
have already noted the secular trend towards greater explicitness, more formalism and greater 
pro-action. 
 
However, there are many factors behind the emergence of what Weale (1992) has described 
as a ‘new politics’ of the environment in Britain, of which the EU is only one.  For instance, 
the politicization of environmental politics (itself accelerated by Europeanization) has 
perturbed the quasi-secretive world of pollution control, as has the advent of public registers 
of information, mechanisms of judicial review and (most recently of all) the formal adoption 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.  New public management has also ushered in 
a much more open and formal style of regulation, although arrangements are still in a state of  
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great flux.  In the last five years, two of the most important independent utility regulators 
have openly challenged the basis of environmental policy decisions on wastewater treatment 
and climate change respectively.  In so doing they have helped to create a more open and 
publicly accountable system of regulation, which has forced central government departments 
to lay bare the financial calculations underpinning environmental standards.  Finally, industry 
too has realized that tougher and more independent regulation plays well with customers, 
employees, shareholders and potential investors alike.  Many large companies are beginning 
to divulge information voluntarily as part of corporate social responsibility initiatives, 
although smaller companies still have a long way to go. 
Overall, therefore, the domestic policy style has changed significantly since 1973, but it is 
has not been transformed and there is no obvious shift towards a completely new policy style.  
There is certainly little appreciable evidence of an imminent phase change to a more 
adversarial style of policy in Britain; informal negotiation and game playing are still the 
lifeblood of British environmental regulation.  Court proceedings are, in any case, expensive 
and judicial review procedures are long, expensive and uncertain as to their outcome.  That 
British environmental groups have often found it more productive to exploit the lobbying 
opportunities in Brussels than London, is a good indication that ‘club government’ (Weale et 
al. 2000: 181) is still alive and well in Britain, albeit in a political system transformed by 
Europeanization.  The EU’s impact on British policy style appears to have been rather more 
indirect.  Europe has certainly helped to open up the British system of regulation to greater 
external scrutiny and reduced the discretion once enjoyed by local officials.   
 
The British policy style in the EU  
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To a large extent, the British have carried this style of working into Brussels (Christoph 
1993).  The British like to think that they are hard negotiators but dutiful implementers of EU 
legislation (Wallace 1997).  British negotiators also believe they inject a dose of 
administrative common sense, while other, supposedly more ‘European’ states, slip into an 
‘easy rhetoric’ about the merits of European integration (Wallace 1995: 47). The British have 
successfully advocated the use of a more consultative and bargained style of working, using 
white and green papers, as well as broader, framework directives, and economic appraisal 
techniques. 
 
In other respects (and particularly during the early years of EU membership), the British 
were forced to adopt a new and somewhat more adversarial policy style in order to resist the 
demands made by other, more pro-environment states and the European Commission.  
However, on many occasions, it was left looking distinctly ‘awkward’ and anti-
environmental.  In fact, some commentators have gone as far as to suggest that many of 
Britain’s European problems stem not from substantive inter-state differences, but 
contrasting styles of bargaining and coalition building (Buller 1995; Wallace 1995).  For a 
variety of reasons (see above), the British find it immensely difficult to speak the language of 
Europe integration. Essentially, they see it as a zero-sum game played between sovereign 
states.  Consequently, they still tend to spend more time trying to defend a fixed national 
position in the Council (a task to which the highly polished but inflexible inter-departmental 
coordination mechanisms are ideally suited), instead of employing more subtle negotiating 
tactics to create broad alliances or shape the all-important ‘pre-negotiation’ stages of the 
policy process.  
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There are, however, signs that the British have started to learn a new, much more 
communautaire policy style in Brussels, especially since Tony Blair’s election in 1997.  
Labour’s politically more engaged stance has made it easier to work inside the EU political 
system to upload policies, than when John Major was Prime Minister.  Interestingly, the 
unexpectedly deep and politically painful Europeanization of environmental policy had 
forced the DoE to adopt this more ‘European’ style already in the early 1990s, i.e. well 
before the arrival of Blair.  This shift was made mainly for pragmatic reasons – the 
department realized that it had to get a firmer grip on EU policy, or risk many more policy 
misfits.  Being more proactively engaged, meant uploading more policies to Brussels, using 
more communautaire language (‘yes, but’ in response to Commission proposals rather than 
an unequivocal ‘no’) and engaging in more ‘corridor diplomacy’ (Jordan 2002) to achieve its 
departmental objectives.  In making these changes, the DoE has transformed itself into one of 
the most European departments in Whitehall (Buller and Smith 1998). 
 
Summary 
To conclude, the national environmental policy style in Britain today is more consultative 
and more anticipatory than it was in 1973.  EU membership is of course deeply implicated in 
this change but there are many other, more important forces behind it.  However, it is clear 
that the EU has: (1) created a more explicit and transparent framework of environmental 
protection, reinforcing the trend towards a more open and transparent policy style; (2) 
generated much more environmental information, which has made it easier for environmental 
NGOs to mount legal challenges to government decisions as part of a gradual shift towards a  
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more adversarial policy style; (3) in many key areas (e.g. acid rain, marine pollution, ozone 
depletion etc.) made British policy considerably more anticipatory; (4) forced British 
negotiators to adopt a more informal and negotiated policy style in order to secure British 
interests in Brussels. 
 
The structures of British policy  
Legal structures 
The impact of the EU is probably most clearly inscribed on legal structures (Macrory 1987; 
1991), which have become more formalized and much more specific in terms of the overall 
objectives to be achieved.  In fact, national law was probably one of the first elements of 
British life to be Europeanized, although the overall extent still came as a very great surprise 
(Nicol 2001).  As in other member states, British government and politics were extremely 
slow to adjust to the rapid and largely unforeseen ‘transformation’ of the EU legal system 
(Alter 2001: 183).  Indeed, throughout the 1970s, central government acted deliberately to 
reduce the depth of change by employing administrative circulars rather than secondary 
legislation to implement EU rules.  This practice had to be discontinued following adverse 
rulings by the ECJ.  Of course, the written word of EU law also has to be interpreted and 
implemented by national enforcement bodies.  Therefore, any assessment of the 
Europeanization of legal structures must also include the concomitant effects on the overall 
style of national policy making, which are discussed more fully below. 
 
Governmental structures 
It is considerably harder to identify a clear ‘EU effect’ on other national structures.  The most 
obvious changes include the creation of a permanent representation (UKREP) in Brussels,  
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the creation of some new regulatory agencies (e.g. the National Rivers Authority), the 
establishment of a European co-ordinating unit in the DoE, the appearance of new procedures 
to secure agreement across Whitehall, and the creation of parliamentary committees to 
oversee the executive’s activities in the EU (Bulmer and Burch 1998; Kassim 2000; 
2001a/b).  However, these are relatively modest impacts.  If anything, the characteristic 
features of policy making in Whitehall remain essentially undiminished.  The ‘Rolls Royce’ 
system of inter-departmental coordination still operates much as it always has.  Westminster 
has developed new procedures to scrutinise the Whitehall departments, but they are strikingly 
similar to those governing national policy.  EU pressures also contributed to the need for 
parliamentary reform (e.g. the creation of select committees) (Giddings and Drewry, 1996), 
but they were certainly not the sole cause (Rasmussen 2001: 158). 
 
However, those who have looked in much greater detail at the Europeanization of 
organizational cultures suggest that the EU has made some Whitehall departments more 
‘European’ in their attitudes and expectations (Buller and Smith 1998).  Research reveals that 
the DoE has indeed ‘learnt’ new, more communautaire tactics, established new alliances and, 
most profoundly of all, adopted a new (i.e. more environmental and more European) 
‘departmental view’ (Jordan 2002).  Rather puzzlingly, Europeanization has strengthened the 
hand of the DoE within Whitehall battles, even though it did not consciously act to secure 
this outcome. 
 
Central-local relations  
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Turning to the relationships between central and local government, Nigel Haigh’s (1986) 
thesis that EU Directives have centralized power in Britain is still extremely apposite, but it 
needs to be seen against the backdrop of a series of important domestic and international 
drivers of change.  So yes, it is true that the logic of European integration has shifted more 
policy making from local levels up to Whitehall and the EU, thereby eroding the power of 
local government and technical agency officials.  But the organizational landscape of British 
environmental policy would have changed regardless of Europeanization, not least to fit the 
new public management aspirations of successive governments since 1979, and Labour’s 
desire to devolve many environmental powers (though not, significantly, the right to 
negotiate in the EU) to the administrations in Wales and Scotland. 
Summary 
Therefore, in terms of policy structures, the EU effect has been quite modest.  However, it is 
clear that the EU has: (1) deeply Europeanized national legal structures; (2) led directly to the 
creation of a small number of new structures; (3) contributed indirectly to the formation of 
new organizations such as the Environment Agency, and the various utility regulators; (4) 
accelerated the centralization of important policy functions from local officials to higher 
administrative levels; and (5) forced structures such as departments to adopt new working 
procedures, tactics and, ultimately, policy preferences (Jordan 2003; Smith 2001). 
 
The content of British policy 
Policy goals and paradigms 
In terms of policy paradigms, the EU has forced Britain to adopt a more preventative, source-
based policy paradigm.  The need for change first arose in the long and acrimonious battle to  
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agree the 1976 Dangerous Substances Directive (see above).  No sooner had this 
philosophical conflict been delicately resolved, than a similarly bitter conflict erupted over 
the application of emission limits (this time enshrined within the principle of best available 
technology (BAT)) to acidic gases.  This time Britain was forced to compromise in the teeth 
of concerted opposition from other states.  In the course of these and other battles (e.g. the 
dumping of waste at sea), the EU made the objectives of national policy more 
environmentally ambitious, specified the instruments to be used to achieve them, and even 
the manner in which they should be applied. 
 
There are, however, three reasons for rejecting the simple view that the EU has forced Britain 
to adopt a more precautionary, source-based paradigm of policy making.  First, to paraphrase 
Albert Weale (1997: 105), Britain has almost certainly lost important aspects of what 
Ministers used to refer to as “the British approach” (see above), but it is still to find a new 
policy paradigm.  Even today, Britain is not wholly committed to ecological modernization 
and feels distinctly uneasy about adopting strongly precautionary policies (O’Riordan, 
Cameron and Jordan 2001), except when it is economically politically favourable (e.g. 
climate change).  A more accurate characterization is therefore one of deep change with 
important elements of continuity both in Britain and the EU.  We can see this reflected in the 
way that Britain succeeded in shaping the IPPC and Water Framework Directives to 
incorporate elements of an EQO approach to setting standards policy. 
 
Second, the depth of change varies greatly across the various sectors of British environmental 
policy (Lowe and Ward 1998: 290).  So, for example, air, noise, water and chemicals policy  
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now follow the EU’s preference for strong source-based controls, whereas land use planning 
and biodiversity protection still (though by no means exclusively) reflect the traditional, 
contextual approach of gradually negotiating targets, rather than specifying a priori some 
absolute level of environmental protection. 
 
Finally, it is debatable whether the pre-existing British approach was ever a paradigm in the 
sense of a narrow, confining cognitive framework (Jordan and Greenaway 1998).  It is 
probably more accurate to view it as a set of politically and economically expedient 
activities, which were only worked up into a broader ‘philosophy’ by British officials seeking 
to justify the status quo to the EU (c.f. Haigh 1989: 22).  In other words, we could say that 
for a time, Europeanization exacerbated the paradigmatic differences between British and EU 
policy, leading, temporarily, to a period of retrenchment. 
 
Policy instruments 
In terms of policy tools, the EU has led directly to the adoption of more source-based 
controls, as well as more formal environmental quality standards for certain air and water 
pollutants.  These reflect the EU’s preference for more harmonized and precautionary based 
policies.  However, for reasons that are widely known, the EU’s toolbox is still 
predominantly regulatory (Jordan et al. 2003).  Consequently, domestic and international 
drivers provide the dominant source of pressure behind the recent appearance of ‘new’ 
environmental policy instruments such as voluntary agreements and eco-taxes (Jordan et al. 
2003). 
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The calibration of policy instruments 
The precise calibration of policy instruments has been clearly and very directly affected by 
the EU.  The EU has created many new emission standards, tightened existing ones and 
formalized their achievement by setting strict deadlines.  The style in which instruments are 
calibrated has also changed, as has the structural context in which the calibration takes place.  
In the past, the ability to constantly fine-tuning of policy instruments to reflect local needs 
and circumstances was highly prized by local technocrats.  Their freedom to manoeuvre has 
decreased dramatically as more and more standards are set within the EU.  This trend has 
eroded the administrative discretion of local officials, who have lost much of their ability to 
‘create’ policy ‘bottom up’ in Britain. 
 
Summary 
In summary, we can say that the EU has: (1) helped to erode (but not completely overturn) 
the contextual policy paradigm by enunciating precise, source-based standards and deadlines; 
(2) changed the objectives of British policy by exerting a strong, upward pressure on 
domestic environmental standards and accelerated the pace of remedial work; (3) introduced 
many more precise objectives and timetables; (4) brought Britain into contact with new 
instruments and influenced the manner in which it applies existing tools; and (5) forced 
Britain to adopt completely new tools such as air quality standards and emission ‘bubbles’. 
 
Two other points are worthy of note.  First, the EU-effect is most obvious in relation to the 
selection and calibration of policy instruments, reflecting the EU’s main function which is to 
develop and disseminate regulatory standards (Lowe and Ward 1998: 291-2).  The EU’s  
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ability to secure paradigm changes is much more indirect.  Rather, the EU operates much 
more as an institutional mechanism through which greener member states can export a more 
precautionary paradigm to other parts of Europe. 
 
Second, the broad pattern of policy shaping and/or taking has been shaped by the pre-existing 
content, style and structure of British policy.  Thus, British exports to the EU have tended to 
be related to the more structural elements of policy, i.e. matters of process and machinery 
such as implementation (IMPEL), EPI (the Cardiff process), IPPC and subsidiarity.  By 
contrast, in the 1980s the Germans pushed targets relating to emissions (e.g. acid rain), 
technology (e.g. BAT) and production (e.g. packaging waste).  Similarly, Britain has been 
better at uploading policies and/or ideas in areas where it has national expertise (e.g. 
biodiversity) (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001a/b) or which developed concurrently with EU 
policies (e.g. waste) (Porter 1998). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
A new British environmental policy? 
The last thirty years have arguably witnessed the appearance of new forms of environmental 
policy making in Britain.  In terms of the content of national policy, there is a more 
consistent and formal system of administrative control based upon fixed standards and 
timetables of compliance, rather than administrative rules of thumb.  There are many more 
source-based, emission controls, and a greater desire to enunciate the underlying principles 
and objectives of control such as precaution, prevention or sustainability.  Policy makers are 
also more willing to experiment with non-regulatory instruments such as environmental taxes  
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and, more recently, tradable permits (Jordan et al. 2003).  In terms of policy structures, 
powers have shifted from local regulators to officials at higher (e.g. EU) levels of 
governance, and new coordinating structures have been created.  Finally, the style of 
environmental regulation is more transparent with greater public involvement. The most 
marked change is to be found in the regulation of public utilities such as energy and water, 
which are now regulated at arms-length from government, by non-departmental public 
bodies. 
 
However, the overall process of change has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  
Thus, if we look at the content of many policies, there is still a strong attachment to informal 
gentleman’s agreements and non-quantified standards.  Central government is still reluctant 
to set clear and legally binding targets other than those specifically required by EU or 
international legislation.  Environmental taxes and voluntary agreements are beginning to 
appear, but regulation still forms the bedrock of national policy.  New departmental 
structures have been created (e.g. the fusion of the departments of transport and environment 
in 1997), but they are not significantly different from what preceded them. In relation to 
Richardson’s schema, the style of British environmental policy is still overwhelmingly 
consensual rather than adversarial (i.e. administrative discretion continues to prevail over 
judicial interpretation) (see below).  It is also remains predominantly reactive. 
 
How much domestic change is Europeanization? 
Not all of these changes are, of course, driven wholly or even partly by the EU.  Of the 
‘domestic’ drivers the most salient are inter alia: the growing public demand for  
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environmental quality; pressure exerted by advisory bodies (e.g. the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution) and Parliamentary select committees; an increasingly large and 
sophisticated network of environmental pressure groups; the ideological preference (by and 
large maintained by Labour (1997-)) for market competition and the modernization of the 
state; and a round of recent constitutional changes including devolution, freedom of 
information legislation and, possibly, the creation of a supreme court on the US model.  The 
most important ‘international’ drivers are international agreements brokered in the UN, 
international bodies like the OECD and the periodic, mega environmental conferences held 
in Stockholm, Rio and Johannesburg.  These have disseminated new ideas and concepts as 
well as more specific emission reduction targets and timetables.  Importantly, these drivers 
would almost certainly have destabilized the domestic environmental policy system 
irrespective of EU membership. 
 
However, so many of the changes noted above are also evident in other member states, to 
suggest that there must be some EU involvement, if only an indirect and contingent one.  One 
way to disentangle the EU from the ‘non-EU’ drivers of domestic change is to consider the 
counterfactual situation i.e. what might national policy have looked like if Britain had not 
joined the EU in 1973?  Regardless of the EU, Britain would almost certainly have been 
forced to modernize its environmental policy by international pressures arising from 
continental Europe.  However, the EU strengthened the arm of those states (like Germany, 
the Netherlands and Denmark) that wished to dominate the regulatory competition to set 
environmental standards.  Without the EU, their influence would have been not as intensely 
focused on states like Britain that had other political priorities and policy arrangements.   
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Consequently, the pace and depth of domestic change in Britain would also have been 
significantly less than has occurred since 1973.  Crucially, were domestic change to have 
occurred outside the EU, it would have adopted a very different form to what we see today, 
with far fewer inflexible timetables, non-negotiable targets and explicit standards. 
 
To conclude, therefore, the ‘EU-effect’ is most clearly inscribed upon the content of national 
environmental policy.  Its effect on national policy structures and policy styles has been 
heavily modulated by domestic factors, though the EU remains an important trigger of 
national action and a constraint upon the autonomy of national actors pursuing ‘domestic’ 
policy objectives. 
 
Forms and modes of Europeanization 
Bache and Jordan (forthcoming) hypothesized that Europeanization could adopt four distinct 
forms (voluntary direct/indirect and coercive direct/indirect).  On balance, it is probably more 
meaningful to try and slot individual items of policy into their 2x2 matrix, rather than 
allocate the whole sector into one or more cells.  That said, over time, Europeanization in this 
sector has gradually changed from being a predominantly externally opposed process (i.e. 
coercive) to being much more voluntary in its basic nature.  This shift corresponds to the 
changing way in which Britain – defined broadly to include the lead department (the DoE), 
as well as British MEPs, environmental and business pressure groups – interacts with EU 
environmental policy making i.e. from negative policy ‘taking’ to a much more proactive 
form of policy ‘making’ in Europe. 
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With hindsight, the British clung to the ‘British approach’ to environmental problem solving 
too doggedly believing it was innately better to anything and everything developed on the 
continent.  Instead of selling the model (or ‘approach’) to the rest of the EU, Britain chose 
instead to dig its heels in and actively resist innovations proposed by the EU.  Very little 
sustained effort was put into uploading policies to Brussels.  In so doing, Britain suffered the 
fate of those that consistently download policy from the EU – namely implementation 
problems, policy misfits, and performance crises (Green Cowles et al. 2001: 8-9).  Therefore, 
although it was never originally pursued for environmental reasons, Britain’s membership of 
the EU has nonetheless transformed national environmental policy in highly unexpected and 
profound ways. 
 
‘Winners’ and ‘losers’ 
Who have been the main winners and losers to emerge from the Europeanization process?   
Europeanization has undoubtedly altered and empowered the DoE.  Through its engagement 
with EU policy making, the DoE has altered its internal management, its tactics and, most 
radical of all, its very identity and political interests.  Its bargaining power in Whitehall has 
grown, not directly (because decision making authority has shifted up from the British 
Cabinet to the much more pro-environment Environment Council) but indirectly as the 
external discipline of implementing EU rules have forced the DoE to intervene in the work of 
and win battles against powerful cognate departments.  Ironically, the DoE initially set out to 
thwart Europeanization by forestalling any European integration in this sector.  It would have 
been a less environmental and a much less powerful department today, had it succeeded in 
this endeavour (Jordan, 2002).  
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Europeanization has also greatly empowered national environmental groups, offering them a 
higher authority to which they can now appeal (Lowe and Ward 1998: 295).  In the 1980s, 
DG Environment actively courted these groups to legitimate enforcement actions arising 
from the misfit between EU and national policy.  More radical groups such as Greenpeace 
and Friends of the Earth first used this new point of leverage in the late 1980s.  More 
recently, less confrontational, ‘insider’ groups such as the WWF and the RSPB have 
successfully used EU nature conservation legislation (i.e. the wild birds and habitats 
Directives) to mount more formal legal challenges against attempts to develop on or near 
protected sites.  Europeanization has also helped to make the standard setting process much 
more transparent, inserting fixed standards where administrative rules of thumb and 
gentleman’s agreements used to be the norm.  Through the mechanism of Directives on, for 
example, access to information, EIA and bathing water quality, the EU has also helped to 
produce and disseminate much more detailed environmental information to pressure groups 
and the public.  In all these different respects, Europeanization has helped to accelerate the 
shift in Britain towards what Weale (1992) has termed a “new” and much more openly 
conflictual politics of the environment. 
 
Thus far, Europeanisation has created two main losers: national parliament (which struggles 
to audit policy making in Brussels) (Armstong and Bulmer 1996: 275; Giddings and Drewry 
1996) and local-level technocrats who used to work in closed policy communities.  
Europeanization has greatly circumscribed their professional discretion and influence. 
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Europeanization: conflicting interpretations 
Broadly speaking, this book adopts a top down approach to understanding Europeanization.  
At a very general level, it is possible to understand the Europeanization of British 
environmental policy in top down terms.  A top down explanation would emphasize the 
determining influence of the deep-seated misfit between the model of environmental 
protection pushed by continental states and the Commission, and the one preferred by island 
member states such as Ireland and the UK.  On this view, this produced an underlying source 
of adaptational pressure i.e. Britain was destined to struggle to cope with the evolution of EU 
environmental policy regardless of its fraught political relationship with the rest of.  The last 
thirty years could, therefore, be portrayed as one long struggle to overcome the first mover 
disadvantage of having innovated earlier and differently to other pioneering EU states.  The 
British approach (that is the pre-commitment to externalize waste into the sea and the air, and 
carefully optimize pollution by carefully negotiating with affected interests), was, in fact, 
doubly disadvantageous: not only was it different to continental models, but it could not 
easily be uploaded to other states, which had similar legal systems and shared many policy 
problems arising from their much stronger geographical affinity. 
 
However, subsequent events do not fit so neatly into this way of thinking.  For example, 
some have argued that notions of ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ are sometime inaccurately presented as 
though they can easily be read off from a ‘snap shot’ comparison of national and EU policy.  
In fact, in this sector ‘fit’ proved to be a constant and recursive process of interaction 
between many different sub-elements of ‘policy’ and also activities at different levels of 
governance (Dyson and Goetz: 2003).  Thus, European integration generated common  
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policies that Europeanised national political systems, which in turn altered the domestic 
circumstances in which national actors formed their national preferences during subsequent 
rounds of negotiation.  The British state struggled to anticipate, let alone control, these 
processes and in the end, was subtly transformed.  Having therefore once been a reluctant 
‘taker’ of policy determined in Brussels, the deep and politically painful Europeanization of 
national policy (Jordan 2002; 2003) eventually forced Britain to take positive steps to ‘shape’ 
EU policy in its own image.  This gradual, temporal shift and the recursive interactions 
between different levels of governance, is difficult to squeeze into a simple top down model  
Second, the misfit concept may even blind the observer to the possibility that national 
policies may even be re-defined in response to adaptive pressure from the EU.  In the case of 
UK environmental policy, some have convincingly argued (Lowe and Ward, 1998) that that 
the “British approach” was never as coherent or as logically set out as it is in section Two.  
They argue that it “came to be defined in reaction to the incursions of EC environmental 
policy.”  They continue: in “emphasizing Britain’s distinctiveness… the differences with the 
Community’s approach were stressed to the point of caricature, and a coherence and 
commitment was claimed for British practices and procedures – that was not entirely 
warranted” (Lowe and Ward, 1998, 18-19). 
 
This raises a third general problem with top down approaches: they tend to overlook the 
many ways in which fits and misfits are socially constructed by non-state actors.  These 
actors either (as in the case of the Commission) seek to recover ground lost at the negotiation 
stage or (as in the case of national groups) adapted themselves to exploit the new political 
opportunities created by EU policy implementation.  These opportunities included the formal  
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site designation process (e.g. the biodiversity and water policies) and the assessment 
provisions of the EIA Directive.  Non-state activities thus helped to realise institutional 
‘misfits’, which would otherwise have remained latent or unexploited.  
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